-
Tytuł:
-
Blended capitation and incentives: Fee codes inside and outside the capitated basket.
-
Autorzy:
-
Zhang X; Department of Social Science, Shanghai University of Engineering Science, China. Electronic address: .
Sweetman A; Department of Economics, McMaster University, Canada. Electronic address: .
-
Źródło:
-
Journal of health economics [J Health Econ] 2018 Jul; Vol. 60, pp. 16-29. Date of Electronic Publication: 2018 Mar 22.
-
Typ publikacji:
-
Journal Article; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
-
Język:
-
English
-
Imprint Name(s):
-
Publication: Amsterdam : Elsevier North Holland
Original Publication: Amsterdam, The Netherlands : North-Holland, c1982-
-
MeSH Terms:
-
Capitation Fee*
Managed Care Programs*
Physician Incentive Plans/*organization & administration
Adult ; Aged ; Algorithms ; Databases, Factual ; Fee-for-Service Plans ; Female ; Humans ; Male ; Middle Aged ; Models, Economic ; Primary Health Care
-
Contributed Indexing:
-
Keywords: Capitation; Fee-for-service; Physician payment model; Primary care
-
Entry Date(s):
-
Date Created: 20180530 Date Completed: 20191127 Latest Revision: 20191127
-
Update Code:
-
20240105
-
DOI:
-
10.1016/j.jhealeco.2018.03.002
-
PMID:
-
29843017
-
Blended capitation physician payment models incorporating fee-for-service (FFS), pay-for-performance and/or other payment elements seek to avoid the extremes of both FFS and capitation. However, evidence is limited regarding physicians' responses to blended models, and potential shifts in service provision across payment categories within the practice. We examine the switch from FFS to a blended capitation-FFS model for primary care physicians in group practice. The empirical analysis shows patients experiencing 9-14% reductions in capitated services and simultaneous increases of 10-22% in FFS services from their rostering physicians. Unusually, our data permit changes among non-rostering physicians to be observed. Other physicians within the rostering group reduce the provision of capitated fee codes, with no net change in FFS services. All other physicians in the jurisdiction reduce both capitated and FFS services, which is consistent with patients concentrating their primary care with one provider as a result of capitation.
(Copyright © 2018. Published by Elsevier B.V.)
