Turnover of environmental protection officials and transboundary water pollution.
Lu J; School of Economics and Trade, Hunan University, Changsha, China. .
Environmental science and pollution research international [Environ Sci Pollut Res Int] 2021 Feb; Vol. 28 (8), pp. 10207-10223. Date of Electronic Publication: 2020 Nov 10.
Typ publikacji :
Imprint Name(s) :
Publication: <2013->: Berlin : Springer
Original Publication: Landsberg, Germany : Ecomed
MeSH Terms :
Conservation of Natural Resources*
Water Pollution*/prevention & control
China ; Environmental Pollution ; Rivers
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Contributed Indexing :
Keywords: Environmental protection official (EPO); Governor; Regulatory distance; Transboundary pollution; Turnover of environmental protection officials (EPOT)
Entry Date(s) :
Date Created: 20201111 Date Completed: 20210218 Latest Revision: 20210218
Update Code :
Considering the situation of the frequent turnover of Chinese environmental protection officials (EPOT), this paper analyzes its impact on transboundary water pollution. The results show that EPOT can reduce transboundary pollution. EPOT can reduce the concentration of DO by 0.261 and NH3-N by 0.167 in the downstream river. And the impact shows a first strong and then weak change over time. EPOT can restrain transboundary pollution by reducing the production of polluting enterprises and promoting public pollution reporting, and it aggravates transboundary pollution by reducing environmental law enforcement and collaborative governance. In addition, the impact of EPOT on transboundary pollution has a distance effect. Within the regulatory distance of 50 km, EPOT has strong inhibition on transboundary pollution. When the governor and the environmental protection official (EPO) change tenure at the same time, the inhibition of transboundary pollution is the strongest. In addition, EPOs from the central government and with working experience in environmental protection departments can control transboundary pollution better.