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Tytuł pozycji:

Moral dynamics: Grounding moral judgment in intuitive physics and intuitive psychology.

Tytuł:
Moral dynamics: Grounding moral judgment in intuitive physics and intuitive psychology.
Autorzy:
Sosa FA; Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States.
Ullman T; Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States.
Tenenbaum JB; Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, MIT, United States; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States.
Gershman SJ; Department of Psychology, Harvard University, United States; Center for Brain Science, Harvard University, United States; Center for Brains, Minds, and Machines, MIT, United States.
Gerstenberg T; Department of Psychology, Stanford University, United States. Electronic address: .
Źródło:
Cognition [Cognition] 2021 Dec; Vol. 217, pp. 104890. Date of Electronic Publication: 2021 Sep 03.
Typ publikacji:
Journal Article; Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.
Język:
English
Imprint Name(s):
Publication: Amsterdam : Elsevier
Original Publication: Hague, Mouton.
MeSH Terms:
Judgment*
Morals*
Humans ; Intention ; Physics
Contributed Indexing:
Keywords: Causal inference; Counterfactual simulation; Effort; Intuitive physics; Intuitive psychology; Moral judgments
Entry Date(s):
Date Created: 20210906 Date Completed: 20211020 Latest Revision: 20211020
Update Code:
20240105
DOI:
10.1016/j.cognition.2021.104890
PMID:
34487974
Czasopismo naukowe
When holding others morally responsible, we care about what they did, and what they thought. Traditionally, research in moral psychology has relied on vignette studies, in which a protagonist's actions and thoughts are explicitly communicated. While this research has revealed what variables are important for moral judgment, such as actions and intentions, it is limited in providing a more detailed understanding of exactly how these variables affect moral judgment. Using dynamic visual stimuli that allow for a more fine-grained experimental control, recent studies have proposed a direct mapping from visual features to moral judgments. We embrace the use of visual stimuli in moral psychology, but question the plausibility of a feature-based theory of moral judgment. We propose that the connection from visual features to moral judgments is mediated by an inference about what the observed action reveals about the agent's mental states, and what causal role the agent's action played in bringing about the outcome. We present a computational model that formalizes moral judgments of agents in visual scenes as computations over an intuitive theory of physics combined with an intuitive theory of mind. We test the model's quantitative predictions in three experiments across a wide variety of dynamic interactions.
(Copyright © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

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