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Title of the item:

International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy

Title :
International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and Institutional Legitimacy
Author(s) :
Chapman, Terrence L.
Source :
Journal of Conflict Resolution, v51 n1 p134-166 2007. 33 pp.
Availability :
Not available from ERIC
SAGE Publications. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, CA 91320. Tel: 800-818-7243; Tel: 805-499-9774; Fax: 800-583-2665; e-mail: ; Web site: http://sagepub.com
URL :
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002706296177
Peer Reviewed :
Y
ISSN :
0022-0027
Descriptors :
Audiences, Foreign Policy, International Organizations, Political Attitudes, Public Opinion, Information Dissemination, Politics
Abstractor :
As Provided
Number of References :
72
Language :
English
Number of Pages :
33
Publication Type :
Journal Articles; Reports - Research
Journal Code :
APR2018
Entry Date :
2008
Accession Number :
EJ807929
Academic Journal
Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the informational role of international institutions. However, several questions about the informational aspects of institutional behavior remain underexplored: What determines how audiences respond to institutional decisions? Through what channels does information provision affect foreign policy? To answer these questions, I develop a formal model motivated by recent literature on the informational effects of security institutions. The formal model depicts information transmission between a domestic audience, an international institution, and a foreign policy maker. Statements issued by member states through the institution serve to inform the audience about the likely outcomes of its leader's actions. The model demonstrates that leaders have incentives to consult relatively conservative institutions, because their support convinces audiences that they should also support proposed policies. Leaders face incentives to avoid the disapproval of more revisionist institutions, because their opposition will tend to induce public opposition. The empirical implications are discussed. (Contains 3 figures and 34 notes.)

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